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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
GARY BOYD HOLDAWAY, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 42981 
 
          Fremont County Case No.  
          CR-2008-1761 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Holdaway failed to establish that the district court erred by denying his Rule 
35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence? 
 
 
Holdaway Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Rule 35 
Motion For Correction Of An Illegal Sentence 
 
 In 2008, Holdaway pled guilty to felony DUI (two or more prior DUI convictions 
within 10 years) and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with three 
years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Holdaway on supervised probation for 
10 years.  (38845 R., pp.32-33, 47-53.)  Holdaway subsequently violated his probation 
 2 
three times and, following the third violation, the district court revoked probation and 
ordered the underlying sentence executed.  (42981 R., pp.26-27.)  Holdaway appealed 
and, on April 2, 2012, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order 
revoking probation and executing Holdaway’s original sentence without modification.  
(42981 R., pp.26-27.)  On December 23, 2013, Holdaway filed a Rule 35 motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence, which the district court denied.  (42981 R., pp.30-34, 
69-84.)  Holdaway filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence.  (42981 R., pp.85-89.)   
“Mindful of controlling authority supporting the district court’s decision,” Holdaway 
nevertheless asserts that the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence in light of his claim that the blood draw taken in his 
case was involuntary and therefore illegal, and because the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 
18-8005, which “makes a third DUI occurring within the previous 10 years a felony,” 
should not have been applied to his 2001 DUI convictions because, he claims, doing so 
“violates constitutional provisions against ex post facto laws.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3.)  
Holdaway has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, a district court may correct a sentence that 
was imposed in an illegal manner within 120 days after the filing of a judgment of 
conviction.  The court may, however, correct a sentence that is “illegal from the face of 
the record at any time.”  I.C.R. 35.  Because these filing limitations are jurisdictional, the 
district court lacks jurisdiction to grant any motion requesting relief that is filed after the 
time limit proscribed by the rule.  State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 748 P.2d 416 (Ct. App. 
1987).  Holdaway’s Rule 35 motion was filed over five years after sentencing.  
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Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to consider only whether Holdaway’s 
sentence was illegal. 
In State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 87, 218 P.3d 1143, 1148 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that “the interpretation of ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is limited 
to sentences that are illegal from the face of the record, i.e., those sentences that do not 
involve significant questions of fact nor an evidentiary hearing to determine their 
illegality.”  An illegal sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory provision or 
otherwise contrary to applicable law.  State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69 P.3d 
153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003).  Rule 35 “cannot be used as the procedural mechanism to 
attack the validity of the underlying conviction.”  State v. McDonald, 130 Idaho 963, 965, 
950 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Ct. App. 1997).   
In its order denying Holdaway’s Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal 
sentence, the district court analyzed the applicable statutes, applied the correct legal 
standards, and correctly determined that Holdaway’s arguments lacked merit because 
“prohibitions against ex post facto laws do not apply to recidivism statutes including, but 
not limited to DUI recidivist statutes,” and because Holdaway’s claim of an illegal blood 
draw was untimely and did not fall within the scope of a motion for correction of an 
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35.  (42981 R., pp.77-83.)  The state adopts as its 
argument the district court’s analysis, as set forth in its Memorandum Decision and 
Order, which is attached as Appendix A and incorporated herein by reference. 
Because Holdaway’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, and 
because the sentence is not otherwise contrary to applicable law, Holdaway has failed 
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to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his motion for 
correction of an illegal sentence. 
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Holdaway’s Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. 
       
 DATED this 17th day of September, 2015. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of September, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
JASON C. PINTLER  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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FILED TN CHAMBERS 
al Idaho FaUs 
BonMvilte County 
-~=.~~~~YtBz~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FREMONT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
GARY B. HOLDAWAY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CR-2008-1761 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
1. FACTS AND PROCED~ 
In 2008, Defendant Gary Holdaway was convicted of driving a vehiole while under the 
influence of alcohol in violation ofl.C. § 18-8004. Based on two priot Dill convictions within the 
10 years prior, the State charged the DUI as a felony. Holdaway's first cotwiction occ.ntTed on 
October 4, 2001 and his s~ond occurred on November 14, 2001. Holdaway nowpet,itions the Court 
to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to l.R. C. 3 S(a) on the basis that I.C. § 18-8005 violates ox post 
facto prohibitions and heca\lse the State violated hls Fourth Amendment rights. 
n. STANDARD OFRli:VIEW 
In State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84,218 l>.3d 1143, 1145 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court 
maintained the narrow scope of a Rule 3S motion. lt held that a trial court cannot examine the 
underlying facts to determine if the sentence is illegal under Rule 3S. See Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 
218 P.1d 1143. The Court defined an "illeg11l sentence" a~ ()M that is illegal frorn the face of the 
record, does not involve a significant question of fact, and does not require an evidentia(y hearing. 
MEMORANDUM DBC[SION AND ORDER - l 
Rece ived Time M.ir. 10. 2014 11:23AM No.1966 Page 77 of 107 
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. l_d. _ at 8_6. Rule ~ 5 is "interpret~ narrowly because, as an illegal ~entence may be corrected at any 
time, the rule must necessarily be limited. to uphold the finality of judgments." State v. Wolfe, 38896, 
2013 Wt 6014054 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2013) cil1ngStare v. Clemenrs, 148 ldaho 82, 84,218 
P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). ln Clements, the Supreme Court stated: 
Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to reexamine the facts underlying the case to 
determine whether a sentence is iUegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow 
category of casei; in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not 
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the original sentence 
was excessive. 
Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d al 1147 (citing State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 223, 177 l>.3d 
966, 9·10 (2008)). 
Ill. ANAL VSIS 
A, Appoiutment of Counsel. 
Holdaway has requested that thi~ Court oppoint cotl.llSel to represent him in thi11 matter. A 
court is not required to appoint counsel ifit finds th.at the motion w1der Rule 35 is frivolou$. 
Although a defendant has an absolute right to retained counsel in a Rule 35 
proceeding, appointed counsel at this stage may be denie.d if the trial court finds 
that the motion "is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous 
proceeding." I.C. § l 9-852(b )(3). Thus, a defendant may b~ denied appointment of 
counsel to assist in pursuing a Rule 35 motion if the trial court finds the motion to 
be frivolous. 
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 5?.3~24, 873 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Ct. App. 1994). 
As set out below, the Court finds that befendant's motion is frivolous and without merit. 
Accordingly, the Court declines to appoint counsel. 
B. Court'• Jurudictiou to Hear a Rule 3S Motton. 
Holdaway now moves the Court to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to I.R.C. 35(a). A 
morion to correct a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner or motion to reduce a sentence 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER· 2 
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. ~u~~uant to R~le 3S(b) must be file ~in "120 days after th~ filljng of judgrµe.nt of cott.viction or 
within 120 days after the court releases retained jurisdiction" !.C.R. 3S(b) (2011) and (2004) 
(amended 2009 and 2011 ). "In contnst, a motion to correct an illegal sentence may bo entertained 
at anytime!' Statev. Wolfe,38896,2013 WL60140S4 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2013); I.C.R. 35(a) 
(?.0 l l ) and (2004) (amehded 2009 and 2011). Therefore, because Holdaway filed a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence, the Court has jurisdiction to heat the case. 
C. Do Ex Post Fucto ProhH,Hio:us Apply to DUI RecidlvL,m? 
Holdaway argues that bis sentonca is illegal because the enhm~ment penalties attached to 
his third DUl conviction violates the prohibitions against ex post facto laws found in Article 1, § 10 
of the United States Constitution and in Article 1, § 16 of the ldaho Constitution. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8005(6) elevates a DUI offense from a misdemeanor to a felony ifthe 
defendant had Within the previous ten years, pleaded guilty to, or had been found guilty of two prior 
violations ofI.C. § l8-8004(a), (b). or (c).1 I.C. § 18-8005(6) (as amended in 2006). 
In October and November of 200 l, Holdaway pleaded guilty or was found guilty of two 
misdemeanor DUl charges pmsuant to l.C. §18-8004. In 2001, I.C. § 18-8005(6) provided that 11 
DUI would coDStitute a felony if the defendant had within the past.five years, pleaded guilty or had 
been fow1d guilty of two previous misdemeanor violations ofl.C. § 18-8004(a) (b) or (c). BeMuse 
Holdaway received his two DUl misdemeanors in 2001, he now argue$ that his 2001 DUI 
misdemeanors should not htlve been the b!l!lis for a felony DUI charge in 2008. Holdaway contends 
that the 2006 amendment to J.C. § 18-8005 increl\Sing the period from five to ten years cannot be 
1 I.C. § 18·8004 is the statue for crime and punishment for person driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicant substances. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
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applie~ retroactively to hls 2001 convictions. As such, Holdaway argue9 that his enhancement to 
felony status for his thir? DUI charge in 2008 violated the prohibitions against ex post focto Jaws. 
There are two basic elements necessazy for a criminal law to be ex post facto: (1) it must be 
retroactivo--apply to &'Vents occurring before its enactment-and (2) it must disadvantage the 
offender affected by it. See Stale v. lAmb, 147 ldabo 13'.3, 206 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2009). An ex post 
facto law is: 
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which 
was innocent when done> criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that 
aggravates a crime, or makes it greitter than it was, when comtnitted. 3rd. :Every law 
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law nnnexed 
to the crime, when committed. '1th. Every Jaw tha.t alters the legal rules of evidence, 
and t'eceives less, or different, testimony, than the Jaw required at the time of the 
conunission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. 
Lamb, 147 Idaho at 135, 7,06 P.3d 11.t 499 citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386,390, 
1 L.Ed. 648, 6SO (1798). 
The punishment imposed under I.C. § 18-8005(6) is based on the third DUI. It does not 
increase the penalty for the prior convictions. In fact, except for the third conviction, there would be 
no punishment beyond what was originally imposed for the first two ours .. Thus, I.C. § 18-8005( 6) 
is an enhanced punishment statute, also commonly referred to as a xecidivist statute. The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently and routinely stated that statutes that increase penalties for 
recidivism do not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. See Parke v. 
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26-27, 113 S.Ct. 517, 521-22, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 401-02 (1992); Spencer v . 
. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,560, 87 S.Ct. 648,651, 17 L.Ed.2d 606,611 (1967); Grygerv. Burke, 334 U.S. 
728, 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683, 1687 (1948); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 
313, 21 S.Ct. 389,390, 45 L.Ed. 542,547 (1901). The Idaho Supreme Court has done the same. See 
Freeman v. Slate, 131 Idaho 722, 963 l'.2d 1159 (1998); State v. Polson, 93 Idaho 912,914,478 
MEMORANDUM DBCJSION AND ORDER - 4 
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P.2d 292, 294 (1970). 
the Idaho Court of Appeals has also rejected ex Post facto challenges to the 'O\JI recidivism 
statutes in State v. Lamb.147 ldaho 133,206 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2009), and Srlife v. Nickerson, 132 
Idaho 406, 411-12, 973 P.2d 758, 763-64 (Ct. App. 1999). 
In Ntck£rson, Nickerson argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
on the basis that the stAtute under which he was convicted of a felony Dill, T.C. § lR-8005(7), 
violated the prohihitions against ex post facto laws found in Article 1, § 10 of the United States 
Constlrution and in Article I,§ 16 oftholdaho ConStitution. Nickerson, 132Idabo at 411,973 P.2d 
at 763 (Ct. App. 1999). Similar to this case, in 1992 the legislature amended I.C. § l R·8005(7) to 
provide that any Dill could be charged as a felony if the defendant had previously been convicted of 
felony driving under the influence within ten years prior, instead of five years as set out in the pre· 
1992 version. Nickerson argued that because his prior convictious occuned prio( to 1991, before 
the enactment of the 1992 version, the statue is an ox post facto law. 
In rejecting Nickerson'1> argument, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted the multiple cases in 
multiple jurisdictions wluch held that amendment of a statute which increases the penalty for a 
repeated crime are not unconstirutional: Stare v. Hickey, 80 Conn.App. S89, 836 A.2d 457 (2003); 
Botkin v. Commonwealth 890 S.W.2d 292 (Ky.1994); State v. Bennett, 870 So.2d 447 
(La.Ct.App.2004); Dtxon v. State, 103 Nev. 272, 737 :P.2d 1162 (1987); Stare v. Marshall, 81 P.3d 
775 (Utah Ct.App.2003); City of Richlandv. Michel, 89 Wash.App. 764,950 P.2d 10 (1998). 
In Freeman v. State, 131 ldaho 722, 963 P.2d 1159 (1998), Freeman raised an identical 
argument to that raised by Nickerson, that the enhlltlcement provision ofl.C. § 18-8005(7) is an ex 
post facto law when applied to a conviction ent~red before adoption of the statute. the Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected Freeman's argumen.t. One of the issues presented by the applicant was 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER· 5 
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~.h.eth~r th.e e~cem~nt provision otl.C._§ 18-8005(7), wh.en i\ppUed to a conviction.that occurred . 
before adoption of the statute, operated as an ex post facto law. The Supreme Court described the 
basis for the district court's dismissal of this claim as follows: 
The district court noted that the issue of whether I.C. § 18-8005(7) operates as an ex 
post facto law has never b~n decided in Idaho, but ldaho courts have decided that 
enhancement pl'OVisions based on persistent violator status do not violate the 
prohibition on ex post facto laws, The district court also noted that other Jurisdictions 
have .reache<l lhe siune conclusion with regard to statutes which provide for increased 
penalties for subsequent our offenses. 
Id. at 722, 963 P.2d at 1159, 
Without further addressing the appltoant's argument, the Supreme Court went on to afflnn the 
dismissal of the post-conviction relief application "for tho reason that there are no meritorious 
issues'\ Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 963 P.2d 1159 (1998). 
Thus, it is well established law that the prohibitions against ex post facto laws do not apply to 
recidivism statutes including, but notlitnited to DUI recidivists statutes. Therefore, Holdaway's ex 
post facto argument lacks merit and is dismissed. 
D. nnM Taking a Blood Sample Violate tl1c Fourth Amendment? 
Holdaway argues that tl1e State violated both the United States Constitution and Idaho 
Constitution when the hospital drew his blood witb.out bis consent. Holdaway atgues that the State 
u.~ed the illegal blood test to convict him of the DUI offense. Such an allegation is not relevant to an 
alleged illegal seutence. The time to challenge a blood draw M$ long since passed, 
Evon if such an 111.'gument were timoly, it fails under State v. Dfaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P .3d 
at 741 (2007). In Diaz, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld I.C. § 18-8002(1) stating "[i]n Idaho 'any 
person who drives or Is in actual physical control' of a vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary 
testing for alcohol at the request of a peace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of DUI." 
MBMORANDUM DBCIS10N AND ORDER• 6 
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Jd .. cittng I.C. §_l.8-8002(1). This. was the .law in effect at the time of the subject blood dl'aw. The 
United States Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. McNeely1 133 S. Ct. 15521 1554, 185 L. Ed. 2d 
696 (2013), does not apply retroactively. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,322 (l 987) (The 
Supreme Court holding that whether a rule applies retroactively hinges on whether a defendant is on 
direct review or post-conviction review). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As set out above, Defendant's motion for appointment of counsel is denied. Furthennoro, 
DefondMt' s motion to cottect an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3 5 is with(?ut merit and is denied. 
l'f IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this~ Jt1.y of March, 2014. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ANr> ORDBR . ·1 
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